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Abstract  
We examine post-inquiry sensemaking by emergency management practitioners following an 
inquiry into the most damaging bushfire disaster in Australia’s history. We theorize a  model 
of post-inquiry sensemaking with four distinct but overlapping phases during which 
sensemaking becomes more prospective over time. In addition to providing important insights 
into what has, hitherto, been a neglected arena for sensemaking studies i.e., post-inquiry 
sensemaking, we also contribute to the understanding of sensemaking more generally. 
Specifically, we show the complex nature of the relationship between sensemaking and 
equivocality, explain how multiple frames enhance sensemaking, and explore temporality in 
sensemaking over time. 
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Research on sensemaking under conditions of equivocality is replete with studies of 
particular incidents – accidents, crises and disasters – where individuals struggle to make 
sense of rapidly changing and dangerous conditions (e.g., Weick, 1993; Cornelissen, Mantere 
& Vaara, 2014). There is also a considerable body of work on how public inquiries make 
retrospective sense of previous incidents (e.g., Gephart, 1993; Brown, 2004). One important 
omission in the literature, however, is post-inquiry sensemaking, which covers the period 
after the inquiry has completed its work, when its recommendations are transferred to the 
organization for implementation. The lack of research is problematic because, first, while 
post-inquiry sensemaking is influenced by the incident and inquiry that precede it, it occurs 
under a completely different set of logistical and organizational circumstances. Accordingly, 
the existing literature offers little insight into the nature of sensemaking in the post-inquiry 
setting. Second, the post-inquiry setting comprises complex temporal dynamics – it arises 
following an incident and inquiry, is shaped by actors’ past experiences of both and, yet, it 
also revolves around trying to prevent subsequent incidents in the future. As such, it is a 
promising site to explore the relationship between retrospective and prospective sensemaking 
(Maitlis & Christianson, 2014) and understandings of temporality (Introna, 2019). A third 
reason why the neglect of post-inquiry sensemaking is problematic is practical – it means that 
organizations lack insight into how inquiry recommendations, designed to prevent negative 
events from happening, can be successfully implemented. 
Motivated by these theoretical and practical concerns, we investigate sensemaking by 
practitioners in emergency management organizations in the state of Victoria, Australia 
following an inquiry into a major bushfire disaster known as ‘Black Saturday.’ This incident 
caused the loss of 173 lives, 2000 homes and 430,000 hectares of land and was immediately 
followed by a Royal Commission to investigate what had gone wrong on Black Saturday. 
This inquiry made 67 recommendations to be implemented by the relevant organizations in a 
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bid to prevent such destruction happening again. By conducting a qualitative, interpretive 
study based on interviews with practitioners working in organizations responsible for 
implementing these recommendations, we show the importance and nature of sensemaking 
following the release of the inquiry’s report.  
Our findings indicate that equivocality does trigger sensemaking in the post-inquiry 
setting. However, sensemaking does not necessarily reduce this equivocality and can, in fact, 
increase it. We theorize a model of post-inquiry sensemaking that incorporates four different 
phases over time, during which equivocality fluctuates as multiple frames are used to 
recognize different cues embedded in the past, present and future. Our study shows how the 
use of multiple frames enables practitioners to recognize, interpret and act on a range of cues, 
making sensemaking more resilient. It also provides a better understanding of the relationship 
between retrospective and prospective sensemaking, showing how the latter supplements and 
gradually replaces the former over time in the post-inquiry setting. Finally, our study helps to 
illuminate the complex, fluid temporal dynamics associated with sensemaking where both 
‘past’ and ‘future’ are part of the ‘present.’  
Post-Inquiry Sensemaking  
In this section, we introduce key sensemaking concepts and explain the links between 
them. We then turn to post-inquiry sensemaking and explain why the lack of research on this 
phenomenon is problematic. 
Sensemaking  
Sensemaking is an ongoing social process whereby individuals create and share 
plausible meanings and understandings (Weick, 1993), enabling them to enact a sensible or 
meaningful environment. To do so, they engage in “conversational and social practices” 
(Gephart, 1993: 1469), such as questioning, framing and storytelling (Brown & Jones, 2000). 
Most studies of sensemaking focus on situations where it has been triggered by equivocality 
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i.e., some form of confusion or ambiguity that gives rise to multiple interpretations (cf. 
Weick, 1990), which interrupts actors’ ongoing activities and forces them “to make sense of 
the interrupted activity in order to be able to resume it” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: S12). 
Equivocality thus creates some form of ‘disruptive ambiguity’ that breaches expectations of 
continuity in organized action, leading actors to engage in sensemaking “to construct a 
plausible sense of what is happening” (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005: 414) and enact “a 
more ordered environment” (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014: 67). In other words, equivocality 
often triggers sensemaking by disrupting ‘sensible’ environments; sensemaking is then 
undertaken to restore sense and meaning and, in doing so, it is assumed to reduce or remove 
the equivocality that gave rise to it. 
When individuals engage in sensemaking as a response to equivocality, they 
recognize and bracket cues in the environment (Barton & Sutcliff, 2009; Whiteman & 
Cooper, 2011). Sensemaking cues are anomalies of some kind that lead individuals to start 
scanning, noticing and framing various phenomena. In this way, they form an initial sense (or 
nonsense) of events, which is subsequently developed into a “more complete and narratively 
organized sense” through further interpretation (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: S14). Cues lead 
individuals to question themselves and others as they try to “bring order into ambiguous 
realities [that are] open to multiple interpretations” (Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012: 1233). 
Fragments of texts, interactions or talk among individuals, specific events and experiences, 
and material objects can all act as cues (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016).  
In order to recognize and interpret cues, individuals draw on particular frames – 
interpretive schemes based on experience, training, culture, and identity. Frames are “past 
moments of socialization and cues tend to be present moments of experience. If a person can 
construct a relation between these two moments, meaning is created” (Weick, 1995: 111). 
Frames help to single out particular aspects of current activities for closer attention, but they 
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can also “leave out much else that may be cues in other frames” (Colville, Pye & Carter, 
2013: 1205). Relying on a single frame may create blind spots that result in cues being 
misinterpreted, sometimes with tragic consequences (Cornelissen et al., 2014). Using 
multiple frames may allow individuals to see cues that they would otherwise miss, but they 
can give rise to conflicting interpretations that prevent sense from being made or shared.   
Most research highlights retrospective sensemaking, which seeks to make sense of 
events in the past (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Brown et al., 2015). Individuals “enact their 
reality, which they, then, retrospectively seek to make sense of and, on the basis of the 
provisional sense made, individuals act again, retrospectively making sense of their new 
action, and so on” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: S9). Some researchers argue that 
retrospective sensemaking hinders more profound understandings by relying on habitual 
interpretations and filtering cues through out-of-date frames (Guiette & Vandenbempt, 2016). 
Accordingly, interest has turned to prospective sensemaking, which occurs as individuals 
“construct intersubjective meanings, images, and schemes in conversation where these 
meanings and interpretations create or project images of future objects and phenomena” 
(Gephart, Topol & Zhang, 2010: 285; also see Gioia & Mehra, 1996; Wiebe, 2010; Stigliani 
& Ravasi, 2012; Mackay & Parks, 2012; Konlechner et al., 2018). Most commentators agree 
that, while prospective sensemaking is undoubtedly important in organizations, it remains 
under-researched and under-theorized (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Brown et al., 2015; 
Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). 
Post-Inquiry Sensemaking 
The post-inquiry setting incorporates the period following an inquiry into a negative 
incident of some kind, when recommendations are transferred to the organization for 
implementation. While there is a significant amount of research on both incidents and 
inquiries, there is virtually none on the post inquiry setting – none of three recent review 
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articles mention it (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Brown et al., 2015; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2015). In this section, we first present an overview of the research on sensemaking in 
incidents and inquiries and then explain why post-inquiry sensemaking differs. 
A considerable amount of the research on sensemaking has examined particular 
incidents, including crises and disaster such as Mann Gulch, Bhopal and Challenger (Weick, 
1993, Vaughan, 1990) or accidents, such as the shooting of a Brazilian man by London police 
who mistakenly thought he was a terrorist (Cornelissen et al., 2014; Colville et al., 2013). 
Equivocality is high during such incidents because conditions are changing rapidly, resulting 
in discrepant cues that are difficult to recognize and interpret. Accordingly, such incidents 
can be “chronically hard to make sense of” (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014: 92) because they 
“are suffused with dynamic complexity” (Colville et al., 2013: 1201) and “continuous 
discontinuous change” (Colville, Brown & Pye, 2012: 8). In such situations, effective 
sensemaking may be crucial to avoid or manage the negative consequences, but difficult to 
enact (e.g., Weick, 1993). 
There is also a rich body of research on the inquiries that conduct ‘second order’ 
sensemaking of the original incident (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015), ostensibly to resolve any 
residual equivocality in relation to what happened and why (Brown, 2004). Inquiries may 
take the form of public hearings commissioned by governments or other authorities to 
investigate what happened in the case of high profile events, such as a pipeline explosion 
(Gephart, 1993), the British ‘arms to Iraq’ affair (Brown & Jones, 2000), and the collapse of 
the Barings Bank (Brown, 2005). They also take the form of internal investigations, such as 
safety and/or accident reviews mandated by regulatory or organizational policy (Ron et al., 
2006; Catino & Patriotta, 2013). Typically, the members of the inquiry craft an authoritative 
account of the incident (Brown, 2004), which resolves equivocality by providing a plausible 
explanation of what happened, thereby rebuilding public confidence and restoring legitimacy 
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(Gephart, 1993; Boudes & Laroche, 2009).  
We argue that sensemaking does not end with the inquiry because of the equivocality 
that is likely to be generated by its report and recommendations. Inquiries may carry the 
weight of authority (Brown, 2004) and be intended to reduce equivocality (Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2015), but differences of opinion and diverse readings of their analysis and 
recommendations are common. Even if a broad consensus surrounds an inquiry’s 
recommendations, the implications for specific organizational practices are often complex, 
confusing, and conflictual. In other words, inquiries and their reports are likely to create 
equivocality and, in turn, generate post-inquiry sensemaking. 
Sensemaking in the post-inquiry setting is, however, likely to take a different form 
than during the incident and inquiry. In the original incident, sensemaking is undertaken in a 
highly compressed period of time and under conditions of extreme danger (e.g., Colville et 
al., 2013), whereas post-inquiry sensemaking tends to have a much longer timeframe and not 
involve physical danger. In the inquiry, sensemaking is undertaken by experts engaged in a 
deliberative process and operating at a distance from the organizations involved (Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2015), whereas post-inquiry sensemaking is undertaken by employees and 
managers responsible for implementing and enacting the necessary changes in the 
organization. Moreover, sensemaking during incidents and inquiries is argued to be 
retrospective (Weick, 1993; Gephart, 1993). Post-inquiry sensemaking, on the other hand, is 
characterized by complex temporal dynamics. These dynamics encompass the past because 
post-inquiry sensemaking is influenced by the earlier sensemaking that took place during the 
incident and inquiry: the recommendations to be implemented are directly informed by the 
sense that the inquiry made of the earlier incident; and some organizational members 
responsible for implementation will have also experienced the original incident and/or 
participated in the inquiry. These dynamics also encompass the future: post-inquiry 
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sensemaking is concerned with the implementation of recommendations that anticipate 
subsequent incidents occurring in the future and seek to prevent and/or mitigate them. 
The distinctive nature of the post-inquiry setting means that the sensemaking 
literature on incidents and inquiries is unlikely to offer much insight. Our aim in this study, 
therefore, is to address this shortcoming by exploring post-inquiry sensemaking: to 
investigate whether equivocality in the post-inquiry setting triggers sensemaking and, in the 
event that it does, examine the form that it takes, including the role played by cues, frames 
and temporality. 
Methods 
Research Setting 
Our study is set in the period following an inquiry into the ‘Black Saturday’ fires, 
which occurred in Victoria, Australia on 7th February 2009. This incident was described as 
“one of Australia’s worst natural disasters” (VBRC, 2010, Final Report: 1). It led to the loss 
of 173 lives, 2000 homes and 430,000 hectares of land, costing an estimated $4 billion. 
Shortly after the fires, the Premier of Victoria established the Victorian Bushfires Royal 
Commission (VBRC) to investigate and make recommendations for dealing with future 
bushfires. In Australia, royal commissions are a form of public inquiry appointed by federal 
or state governments to investigate issues deemed to be particularly important or sensitive 
(Prasser, 2012). The VBRC was headed by three commissioners, assisted by lawyers, who 
could use statutory powers to solicit testimony under oath from witnesses. It held 26 
community consultations, received nearly 1,700 public submissions, conducted 155 days of 
hearings, heard from 400 witnesses, and received over 100 submissions (see VBRC, 2010, 
Volume III).  
The Commission’s final report was released in July 2010. It ran to four volumes 
comprising thousands of pages and made 67 recommendations for change in how emergency 
 
 
 
10 
management organizations handle bushfires. These recommendations were accepted by the 
Victorian Government, which established an Implementation Monitor to report on progress. 
It noted that the majority of over 300 actions established to meet the requirements of the 67 
recommendations had been implemented in a timely fashion by 2014 (Implementation 
Monitor, 2014).  
In order to get an in-depth understanding of sensemaking, we decided to focus on 
Recommendation One, which recommended that the longstanding Bushfire Safety Policy be 
revised. The previous policy – known as ‘Stay or Go’ – encouraged people to make an early 
decision about whether to stay and defend their property during a bushfire or whether to 
evacuate before the fire arrived. It advised householders who decided to stay to have 
strategies in place to maximize their chances of survival. Conversely, if individuals decided 
to evacuate, it recommended that they leave at least 48 hours prior to the predicted arrival of 
the fire. The Commission’s report argued that the Black Saturday fires had exposed 
weaknesses in the original ‘Stay or Go’ policy, and recommended a new policy to:  
• enhance the role of warnings – including providing for timely and 
informative advice about the predicted passage of a fire and the actions to 
be taken by people in areas potentially in its path 
• emphasize that all fires are different in ways that require an awareness of 
fire conditions, local circumstances and personal capacity 
• recognize that the heightened risk on the worst days demands a different 
response […] 
• improve advice on the nature of fire and house defendability, taking 
account of broader landscape risks (VBRC, Final Report: 23). 
Our selection of this recommendation is an example of ‘purposeful’ sampling (Patton, 2015). 
Recommendation One involved significant changes in emergency management (see Table 1) 
and, as such, seemed likely to generate equivocality which would, in turn, lead to 
sensemaking. Additionally, the fact that 13 out of the 15 actions concerning Recommendation 
One had been successfully implemented by 2014 (Implementation Monitor, 2014) suggested 
that sensemaking had been successful.  
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– Table 1 here –  
Data Collection and Analysis 
In 2014, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 62 emergency management 
practitioners who worked for organizations that played prominent roles in the Black Saturday 
bushfires.1 They included senior managers (20), middle managers (21) and functional experts 
(21). Senior managers had overall responsibility for coordinating fire-fighting efforts. Middle 
managers had regional/unit-level responsibilities and line authority over varying numbers of 
subordinates. Functional experts had specialist expertise e.g., information officers, planning 
officers, and operational fire-fighters (Table 2).  
– Table 2 here –  
Interviewees were asked semi-structured questions about their experience of how the 
Commission’s recommendations were implemented in their organizations, as well as specific 
questions regarding Recommendation One and its impact. Interviews lasted between 30 and 
90 minutes and resulted in 65 hours of interview recordings, which were transcribed 
verbatim. Our analysis of the interview data was interpretive and took the form of three main 
types of coding: descriptive, analytical, and pattern/inferential (cf. Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
The aim was to move iteratively between the sensemaking literature and the data in order to 
elaborate inductively-based concepts from the data, provide a higher level of abstraction, and 
then trace relationships among them. See Figure 1 for a summary of this coding. 
– Figure 1 here –  
We had selected our case on the assumption that the Commission’s report would give 
rise to equivocality and, in turn, lead to sensemaking. We therefore conducted the first phase 
of analysis to ascertain whether our assumptions were correct, as well as discern the ways in 
which the key concepts were connected to each other (cf. Catino & Patriotta, 2013). Based on 
 
1 For confidentiality reasons, we do not name these organizations. 
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definitions of equivocality and sensemaking in the literature, we identified a list of terms to 
aid us in analyzing the interviews. Accordingly, we examined interview transcripts for 
mention of words like ‘uncertainty’, ‘complications’, ‘confusion’, ‘out of control’, ‘doubt’, 
‘challenge’, ‘dilemma’ and ‘conflict’ to indicate evidence of equivocality in relation to 
Recommendation One. We then inferred preliminary evidence of sensemaking from terms 
such as ‘sense’, ‘interpret’, ‘understand’, ‘discuss’, ‘dialogue’ and ‘agree’ (Table 3). This 
initial analysis confirmed that the post-inquiry setting was marked by equivocality and that 
sensemaking had taken place. 
– Table 3 here –   
We then examined the interview transcripts where these terms were mentioned to 
elaborate the basic descriptive codes into more nuanced analytical codes. In the case of 
equivocality, the interviews provided evidence to suggest that interviewees’ experiences of 
equivocality changed over time. We therefore coded for evidence that the degree of 
equivocality at a particular moment in time was high by identifying instances when 
interviewees made regular mention of uncertainty, confusion and ambiguity, as well as other 
instances when they did not mention these terms (low equivocality). We also explored the 
interviews for evidence as to whether the degree of equivocality was changing and, if so, in 
what direction. We found instances where equivocality appeared to be decreasing, as well as 
instances where it seemed to be increasing (Table 4). 
– Table 4 here –   
To explore sensemaking, we looked for evidence of cues and frames based on the 
literature. In the case of cues, we examined transcripts for evidence that indicated 
interviewees had become aware of some sort of discrepancy or anomaly that they had not 
fully understood, and which prompted them to engage in discussions with others in order to 
obtain a better understanding. We found that some cues were embedded in the past 
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experience of the incident and/or the inquiry, including its report i.e., the practitioners whom 
we interviewed referred back to the original incident and/or the Commission hearings and/or 
their reactions to reading the final report. We also found evidence of other cues embedded in 
the process of implementation i.e., interviewees referred to discrepancies between what the 
recommendations required and what individuals or the larger organization were capable of. 
Finally, we found evidence that some cues were embedded in imagination i.e., interviewees 
noted discrepancies as they speculated what the implementation of the recommendations 
would mean for future bushfires (Table 5). 
– Table 5 here –   
In the case of sensemaking frames, we examined the interviews for evidence of 
interpretive schemes, based on mention of experience, training, culture and identity as 
interviewees reported noticing and interpreting anomalies. We identified four frames: a 
professional frame associated with the expertise, training and identity of the emergency 
management practitioners; a forensic frame connected to investigative processes associated 
with the Commission and the expertise, training and identity of the lawyers; an authority 
frame where individuals referred to the legal status of the Royal Commission; and an 
organizational frame where individuals talked in terms of the goals, structure, culture and 
identity of their organization (Table 6). 
– Table 6 here –   
In the third stage of analysis, we developed inductive patterns and identified 
relationships among categories – we noticed certain patterns among equivocality, cues and 
frames indicating four clusters (see Figure 1 under ‘pattern codes’). We explored whether 
these clusters occurred in a particular temporal sequence between 2010, when the inquiry 
report was released, and 2014, when we conducted our interviews. Accordingly, we re-
examined instances where the activities in each cluster were described, paying particular 
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attention to the verb tense used by interviewees, and also cross-referencing across interviews 
to ascertain whether there was agreement concerning the sequencing of activities. This 
analysis was subjective since our data took the form of retrospective accounts (see our 
discussion of limitations in the conclusion). However, we gleaned sufficient evidence to 
indicate that the clusters occurred sequentially, although they were not completely distinct or 
separate.  
One cluster of sensemaking activities – a series of new organizational sensemaking 
conversations – occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Commission’s report. We refer to 
this cluster as ‘Phase I Sensemaking.’ Interviewees indicated that the initial response in 2010 
was to set up various meetings and committees where conversations could take place to make 
sense of the inquiry’s recommendations with statements like “We started by setting up a 
steering committee …” Interviewees described another cluster of sensemaking activities as 
they started to develop new tools and technologies. We refer to this cluster as ‘Phase II 
Sensemaking’ insofar as interviewees indicated that these activities occurred as a result of the 
initial conversations and took some time to complete. For example, interviewees indicated 
that a specific new technology was developed, but then required a “massive” retraining of all 
staff. ‘Phase III Sensemaking’ related to a new understanding of emergency management 
organization. It appeared to follow from Phase II in that interviewees suggested that, in order 
to incorporate the new warning tools and technologies, more fundamental changes were 
needed. Finally, ‘Phase IV Sensemaking’ appeared to take place later still, as evidenced by 
interviewees talking about concerns that they still had in 2014, and with specific reference to 
technological and organizational changes that had already been made.  
Post-inquiry Sensemaking over Time 
In this section, we present our findings showing that post-inquiry sensemaking took 
the form of four phases (see Table 7 for a summary).  
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– Table 7 here –   
Phase I Sensemaking: Questioning  
Equivocality engendered by the Royal Commission’s report resulted in sensemaking 
insofar as emergency management practitioners from different levels, functions and 
organizations started to engage in a series of new conversations in a bid to understand what 
the recommendations meant.   
We started by setting up a steering committee, which established a community 
fire emergency information unit that was headed up by [a senior manager]. We 
then had to look at all these changes that [Recommendation One] required 
(Incident Controller 2). 
This initial sensemaking was primarily retrospective. Interviewee accounts referred to cues 
embedded in the original incident i.e., where things had gone wrong on Black Saturday, 
which they re-visited using a professional frame based on their knowledge and experience of 
bushfires.  
Yes, I was [on duty on Black Saturday]. I guess visually being able to see the 
enormity [of what was happening] because we had the state map and, of course, 
wherever there were incidents, there were the symbols and things. So, you could 
just see right across the state, just the enormity of it …  So, in terms of some of 
the key things that we probably learned about information and warnings to 
communities as a result of Black Saturday, was really the importance of timely, 
relevant and tailored information (Community Engagement Manager 2). 
Interviewees also referred to cues embedded in the Commission’s inquiry i.e., anomalies and 
inconsistencies in firefighting practices were revealed as a result of the inquiry process.  
I reckon the Commission was correct in that we were very operationally focused 
on putting the fire out at all costs and the bit that the Commission picked up on 
[was] about not adequately keeping the community informed, pre- and during 
and post- the event (Regional Fire Operations Officer 1).  
Here, we discerned that emergency management practitioners used a forensic frame that 
emanated from the investigative processes employed by the Commission. In this case, it was 
the expertise, training and identity of lawyers and Commissioners, who through the use of 
experts, questioning, research, etc., helped practitioners to make sense of the events of Black 
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Saturday. 
Interviewees indicated that, as a result of this initial sensemaking, they began to 
question their existing understandings concerning Victoria’s safety policy and the role of 
warnings. Insofar as sense was made, individuals came to a shared conclusion that previous 
practices had failed.  
One of the big things with Black Saturday especially with our post, [was] once 
you find out that, because the fire was so intense, fire-fighting was pretty much 
futile. What we should have done was down tools, and then started a 
commentary to say: ‘Well, we can’t fight this fire’ (Deputy Chief Officer 2). 
In other words, it became clear that practices associated with the existing ‘Stay or Go’ policy 
had not worked on Black Saturday.  
This sensemaking appeared to do little, however, to reduce the equivocality generated 
by the Commission’s report. Although practitioners agreed that practices had been 
problematic, it was not clear to them as to why the practices had failed. As a result, 
interviewees talked of continuing confusion and uncertainty. 
Black Saturday … just went crazy and caused all this devastation and years’ 
worth of looking back and trying to understand it (Community Information 
Officer 1). 
Even when individuals indicated that they had come to understand what had gone ‘wrong’, 
they were far less clear about what the solutions were.  
We'd lock ourselves away, have a chat and have lunch together and say: ‘All 
right, what’s our problem?’  ‘How do we fix it?’  You need to do that. I need to 
do that. We need to talk to this person. Off we go. Then we come back a week 
later. ‘How did we go?’ So, it was constant flux (Deputy Chief Officer 2). 
In sum, initial sensemaking was associated with the creation of new conversations in 
which retrospective sensemaking took place as cues embedded in the incident and the inquiry 
were recognized. Using professional and forensic frames, interviewees started to make sense 
of Black Saturday by questioning past practices and coming to a shared understanding that 
these practices had clearly failed on Black Saturday. This phase of sensemaking was the 
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initial reaction to equivocality generated by the Commission’s report, although it had little 
impact in reducing it.  
Phase II Sensemaking: New Tools and Technologies 
The focus of sensemaking then shifted from questioning longstanding practices 
towards developing a shared understanding about new tools and technologies that would 
prevent some of the problems encountered on Black Saturday. This sensemaking was 
retrospective insofar as interviewees referred to cues embedded in the inquiry i.e., the 
Commission’s report and its recommendations.  
There [was] a range of things that [Recommendation One] was obviously going 
to change. The facts around the public warnings and the messaging to the 
community being a paramount one (Regional Operations Manager 2). 
In this instance, there was evidence of an authority frame i.e., practitioners took steps to 
develop new tools and technologies because they were legally obliged to. In this case, the 
frame was not of the practitioners own making, such as their training and identity. Instead, it 
drew from the official identity and legal status of the inquiry.  
The Royal Commission comes along, makes the recommendations it makes, 
and government accepts all of those.  So, the minute that happened, of course, 
that then forces us into a process of change (Executive Director 2). 
This authority frame was reinforced by the Victorian government’s support for the 
recommendations and its appointment of an Implementation Monitor to track progress.   
You couldn't opt out. You couldn't say I am not going to play with you, because 
[the Implementation Monitor] would smack you in the head (Deputy Chief 
Officer 2). 
There was, however, also evidence of prospective sensemaking: while 
Recommendation One might have demanded that the emergency management organizations 
improve warnings, the Commission did not – and could not – give detailed guidance on 
exactly which particular tools and technologies should be developed, and how. This had to be 
worked out by the practitioners. Based on their professional expertise, training and identities 
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(i.e., a professional frame), practitioners discerned cues embedded in the implementation 
process as they identified anomalies and incongruities that would impede the development of 
new tools and technologies.   
There was a group set up with the whole development of the ‘one source, one 
message’. So, that had to be developed in a very short timeline, and then it was 
a matter of retraining all our staff and those sorts of things (Community 
Engagement Manager 2). 
This sensemaking helped practitioners develop specific tools and technologies to 
implement Recommendation One. A ‘one source one message’ system – a web-based 
messaging tool – enabled incident control teams to post emergency alert messages on an 
electronic platform and disseminate them to all mobile devices in affected communities, 
social media, and the websites of all emergency management organizations. ‘E-mapping’ 
enabled functional experts to profile risks that were emerging in different regions according 
to predicted fire patterns and tailor warnings to the severity and stage of the fire.  
In sum, new tools and technologies emerged from a mix of retrospective and 
prospective sensemaking. Practitioners referred back to cues in the report through an 
authority frame, and as well as using a professional frame to refer forward to cues in the 
implementation process that could impede the functionality of these tools and technologies. 
In this way, they came to a shared understanding of how to warn the community more 
effectively. This phase appeared to reduce equivocality: when interviewees talked about new 
tools and technologies, there was little mention of confusion, uncertainty or ambiguity. 
I was amazed just how much has happened in the community information and 
warning space to the point that other jurisdictions are now looking at what we 
are doing in Victoria. It’s come a long way (Communications Manager 1). 
E-mapping is really assisting us to … assess what the likely threats and risks 
are. So, we’re much better at the predictive side of things. We’re getting on the 
front foot and that’s really helpful (Incident Controller 4). 
Phase III Sensemaking: New Meanings of Work 
The development of new tools and technologies for monitoring bushfires and 
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communicating with communities helped to reduce equivocality, but it did not mean the end 
of sensemaking. In fact, further sensemaking took place as practitioners attempted to 
incorporate these new tools and technologies into emergency management operations. This 
phase of sensemaking resulted in a new understanding of what the work of emergency 
management involved – warning the community was now as important as putting out the fire.   
We had to … literally redefine the role of community engagement. For the 
incident controllers and the operations people, the previous focus had been on 
suppression tactics – they were happy simply to tell the community they were 
putting the fire out (Community Information Officer 1). 
Specifically, practitioners came to an understanding that the meaning of ‘fighting’ fires 
needed to be redefined in order to incorporate ‘communications.’ This, in turn, would require 
significant changes in how emergency management was organized. 
There was a time I would have said that an Incident Controller’s right-hand man 
is his Operations Officer, now I’d say it’s his Information person. In days gone 
by, we would have put the fire out and then told the community but, now, we 
keep them informed (Regional Manager 3). 
This phase was characterized by some retrospective sensemaking insofar as the Royal 
Commission had indicated that a new approach to warnings and communication must be 
instituted i.e., sensemaking was driven by cues from the inquiry discerned by practitioners 
through an authority frame.  
At the operations level there really wasn’t the respect for giving the community 
information. It was all about putting water on the fires. So, there was a whole 
load of work that needed to happen around change management initiatives. It 
just wasn’t part of the organization. And the only way this changed was as a 
result of the recommendations around warning and information. The Royal 
Commission was the only thing that was big enough to tell us all what we 
needed to do (Project Officer 1). 
However, the specific changes that would be required were unclear. 
We couldn’t fix all these problems in four years because it [was] culture 
problems … from my point of view it takes 5-10 years to change culture 
properly (Senior Operations Officer 1). 
Sensemaking was therefore also prospective as practitioners discerned cues embedded in the 
implementation process by identifying future problems that could impede the new tools and 
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technologies being put into practice. 
We had a lot of difficulty with acceptance of responsibility. People were not 
willing to take it up … that was a real problem with cultural change, which 
wasn’t recognised by the organization. Some of us who’ve been involved in 
cultural change said: ‘You will just have to accept people will fight you, and 
they will push you back and they will act up and, sometimes, you will have to 
be a little bit rough with them to push them’ (Logistics Officer 1). 
These cues were discerned by practitioners’ drawing on an organizational frame, 
rather than the professional one adopted in the previous phase. There was less focus on the 
practicalities of immediate tasks or the functionality of specific tools and more emphasis on 
the future alignment of organizational activities with a new definition of emergency 
management.  
The recommendations have resulted in degrees of changing the culture: 
changing the thinking, changing the approach for a whole range of things that 
weren’t ostensibly part of the recommendations per se (Project Manager 4). 
As new understandings emerged regarding the incorporation of communications into 
operations and the need for an organizational or inter-organizational response, equivocality 
appeared to decrease. Individuals expressed considerable certainty and confidence when they 
spoke about these organizational changes. 
The willingness to work together is far greater than I’ve ever witnessed … it’s 
the attitude within the leadership and the staff within all of the agencies that has 
undergone the biggest change in a maturing sort of sense, [with] a level of 
sophistication of thought that is different (Executive Director 1). 
We had traditionally been very focused, up to Black Saturday, on procedural 
aspects and, if it wasn’t written, it did mean that you didn’t do it. We’re still not 
there yet, but there’s a far greater appreciation of the importance of relationships 
within agencies, but also across agencies, and the team concept (Incident 
Controller 2). 
In this phase, sensemaking was associated with a new meaning for emergency 
management work as practitioners came to understand that the effective use of new tools and 
technologies required more profound organizational changes. It followed from the 
development of new tools and technologies, but also extended beyond it. 
It [Recommendation 1] changed my role in a major way. I remember a senior 
 
 
 
21 
manager coming to me and saying that they were anticipating a lot of change in 
the warning and information area. [S/he] wanted to know if I wanted to be 
involved for a couple of months – that was five years ago (Project Manager 3). 
This phase of sensemaking was both retrospective and prospective as an organizational frame 
was brought to bear on potential implementation issues, rather than immediate practical 
concerns. Equivocality, which had already been decreased by the development of new tools 
and technologies, appeared to decrease even further. 
Phase IV Sensemaking: Speculating  
We identified a fourth phase of sensemaking as interviewees started to reflect more 
fundamentally on the implications of the changes that had been implemented for future 
bushfires. 
The reality is we can’t change the environment. Eucalypt forests have evolved, 
and we’ve been messing around [with them] for 200 years and made a bit of a 
hash of it. So, I do think that the Royal Commission was a missed opportunity 
to have a debate with … about what it is to live in this physical environment 
(State Coordinator 1). 
This phase of sensemaking queried whether the new warning system would inadvertently 
absolve people living in fire-prone areas from taking responsibility for their own safety in the 
future.  
While there’s been clear improvements around how to warn community and 
whatever, and how we work together, I think the end result will be quite 
destructive … I think the Royal Commission … absolved a lot of people of their 
personal responsibility. It … destroyed the notion that if you are going to stay 
in the bush, or you’re going to live deep in the bush, then you have to have a 
plan (Director 2).  
In this phase, sensemaking was prospective. Cues were embedded in practitioners’ 
imagination i.e., by looking into the future and imagining what might happen through a 
professional frame.  
You do wonder, will … the change actually make a difference if we get another 
day like Black Saturday? I suppose the Royal Commission has left a legacy now 
where people are now expecting more in terms of warning and that’s bound to 
be difficult (Communications Manager 1). 
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Practitioners anticipated that the new practices would fail in the event of another Black 
Saturday, as a result of which equivocality started to increase again. 
There are better systems in place now for warning the public [but] I reckon if 
we had another Black Saturday we’d still be in a lot of trouble. We’d probably 
have a better outcome, but it still wouldn’t be good. I still think you’d have a lot 
of houses lost and I suspect you’d still end up having people being killed 
(Regional Operations Manager 1).  
To recap, in this fourth phase sensemaking became more prospective as practitioners 
used a professional frame to wrestle with cues embedded in their imagination, leading them 
to anticipate the future failure of the new practices that had been implemented. While 
equivocality had decreased as a result of new tools and technologies and the new 
understanding of what emergency management meant, it now appeared to increase again. 
A Model of Post-Inquiry Sensemaking 
In this section, we present a model (Figure 2) of post-inquiry sensemaking that 
consists of four phases taking place over time. 
– Figure 2 here –  
The first phase of post-inquiry sensemaking – the immediate response to the inquiry 
report and recommendations – is primarily retrospective as practitioners recall cues 
embedded in both the incident and inquiry through forensic and professional frames. The 
forensic frame, derived from the investigative process, submits the professional frame to 
deeper scrutiny, helping practitioners to recognize additional cues and calling into question 
deeply rooted understandings concerning professional practice. If practitioners reject the 
forensic frame – which may occur if the inquiry over-emphasizes blame, practitioners are 
excluded from participating, or the ability and expertise of inquiry members are challenged – 
important cues embedded in the inquiry will be missed. As a result, practitioners may fail to 
question existing understandings of professional practice and are more likely to repeat the 
mistakes of the past. It seems unlikely that practitioners would adopt a forensic frame and 
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reject the professional frame given their background, training and identity but, if they did, 
then initial sensemaking would probably be hindered by an inability to access professional 
expertise and tacit knowledge. Thus, when used together, the two frames complement each 
other in challenging existing understandings, although the result is that equivocality, which is 
already high following the inquiry, increases further. 
The second and third phases of post-inquiry sensemaking follow from the initial 
sensemaking conversations. They are both partly retrospective in that cues embedded in the 
inquiry are recognized through an authority frame typically in the form of legal and/or formal 
obligations. However, sensemaking also starts to become prospective as practitioners use 
professional and organizational frames to identify cues embedded in the immediate future of 
the implementation process. These cues include signals of shortcomings of new tools and 
technologies (Phase II) and potential organizational barriers to change (Phase III). Using 
multiple frames during these two phases allows practitioners to put professional and 
organizational flesh on the bare bones of the recommendations. The authority frame directs 
practitioners towards cues related to legal or formal obligations; professional and 
organizational frames help individuals make sense of how they might carry out these 
obligations. As a result of these two phases, sensemaking reduces equivocality by helping 
individuals both to make of what went wrong and to implement solutions. 
Failure to employ all three frames during these two phases is likely to hinder 
sensemaking. First, practitioners that reject the authority frame by ignoring or resisting the 
inquiry’s recommendations will likely incur political or managerial sanctions. Second, 
surrendering to the authority frame without reference to professional and organizational 
frames makes it difficult to make sense of the future issues that might arise when 
recommendations are embedded in particular work and organizational contexts. Third, 
privileging a professional frame over an organizational frame will result in practitioners who 
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are unable to see the ‘big picture’ and remain mired in the intricacies of their particular 
professional specialism. As a result, new tools and technologies may prove ineffective 
because they are not successfully incorporated into the larger organization. Finally, 
privileging the organizational frame at the expense of the professional frame – which may 
occur if, for example, senior managers drive organizational change without consulting 
practitioners – will undermine implementation through a misalignment between 
organizational arrangements and specialist expertise.  
In the fourth phase, sensemaking becomes even more prospective as individuals 
speculate what could happen by projecting cues into a longer-term hypothetical future. It 
leads to an understanding that new practices and meanings are not foolproof and may fail in 
the future despite – or even because of – successful implementation. This phase of 
sensemaking involves forward-looking, ‘anticipatory’ reflection (Raelin (2001), as 
practitioners’ imagination gives form to unknown things, invents new meanings and creates 
new realities (Weick, 2006; Komporozos-Athanasiou & Fotaki, 2015). Equivocality starts to 
increase as the possibility of future incidents becomes apparent and practitioners realize that 
implementing inquiry recommendations has not solved all the problems and may even have 
created new ones. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Our study makes a number of contributions to the sensemaking literature. First, it 
shows that post-inquiry sensemaking takes the form of four distinct but overlapping phases 
that occur over time. Contrary to research that suggests that sensemaking reduces 
equivocality (e.g., Weick, 1995; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014), our study shows that post-
inquiry sensemaking is characterized by fluctuating equivocality. The first phase increases 
equivocality as individuals question previous practices; and, while the second and third 
phases of sensemaking reduce it, speculation about the future increases it again during the 
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fourth phase. Accordingly, our study suggests that the link between sensemaking and 
equivocality is more complex than is generally assumed and that certain forms of 
sensemaking can exacerbate equivocality. 
Our study also shows that the distinct nature of the post-inquiry setting enables 
individuals to use multiple frames associated with different organizational settings to 
recognize cues. These frames are performative – they enable different cues to be ‘seen’, 
interpreted and acted upon. Our study explains how combining frames helps individuals to 
see a problem from existing viewpoints and change their perspective. However, contrary to 
the existing literature, which tends to assume that blending multiple frames and/or 
introducing new frames results from ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ who engage in ‘skilful 
reframing’ (Werner & Cornelissen, 2014), our study suggests that frames are available to all 
actors as they navigate different organizational settings. In other words, events during an 
incident encourage practitioners to engage in sensemaking through a professional frame. The 
fact that an inquiry involves a deliberative, investigative process provides access to a forensic 
frame; while its formal status gives rise to an authority frame. Insofar as implementation 
involves organizational changes that extend beyond the narrow confines of individual 
specialisms, practitioners can supplement their professional frame with an organizational 
frame. In this way, our study suggests that resilient sensemaking can occur among 
organizational members who are not necessarily organizational elites or gifted change agents.   
Third, our study provides considerable insight into prospective sensemaking, showing 
how it occurs through the recognition of cues embedded in anticipated future events – such as 
those associated with the implementation process – as well as in practitioners’ imaginations. 
In contrast to Stigliani and Ravasi (2012) who found that prospective sensemaking occurred 
through interrelated cycles of retrospection in the creative setting of a design consultancy, our 
study indicates that prospective sensemaking expands progressively over time in the post-
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inquiry setting where recommendations are being implemented. It also questions whether 
prospective sensemaking necessarily ‘interrupts’ retrospective sensemaking as proposed in 
some studies (e.g., Rosness et al., 2016). We found that it initially complements retrospective 
sensemaking but will, eventually, displace it through a process of ‘progressive 
approximations’ (cf. Weick, Sutcliff & Obstfeld, 2005). However, unlike Weick, we do not 
see these approximations as “redrafting of an emerging story so that it becomes more 
comprehensive, incorporates more of the observed data, and is more resilient in the face of 
criticism” (Weick, Sutcliff & Obstfeld, 2005: 415). Rather than relying on retrospective 
sensemaking to shore up a linear story of ‘successful’ implementation, practitioners 
combined it with prospective sensemaking – both within and across multiple post-inquiry 
sensemaking phases – to bring about implementation and, having done so, to critique it and 
adapt it to future circumstances, thus making implementation, rather than the narrative of 
implementation, more resilient.  
In this way, our study challenges the idea that prospective sensemaking always occurs 
through ‘perfect future’ thinking (Weick, 1979), where the future is viewed as having already 
occurred as individuals “envision a desired or expected future event and then act as if that 
event had already transpired, thus enabling a ‘retrospective’ interpretation of the imagined 
event” (Gioia, Corley & Fabbri, 2002: 623). Instead practitioners in our study dealt with the 
“quandary of living forward” (Mackay & Parks, 2012: 367): after having implemented new 
tools and meanings to address the past, they speculated that they could “still end up having 
people being killed” in possible future bushfires. In other words, practitioners can make sense 
of an indeterminate future through speculation, anticipatory reflexivity and a collective 
memory that is in flux over the different phases of sensemaking rather than reified in a linear 
narrative. 
In carrying out prospective sensemaking in this way, practitioners used a 
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conceptualization of ‘event time’ (Patriotta & Gruber, 2015) by imagining how future events 
– incidents – might unfold during the next bushfire season. Patriotta & Gruber (2015: 1576) 
show how event time occurs in a newsroom as unplanned events are mapped against shared 
baseline expectations about the temporal progression of planned events. When deviations 
from the expected occur, collective understandings are updated in order that practitioners can 
“fit work into time”. In this way, surprising events are managed as they arise through 
sensemaking in the present. Our study shows the important role of a prospective form of 
event time as practitioners anticipate events, allowing them to update their understandings of 
both what has happened and what may happen as they imagine in the present. Shared 
understandings concerning the efficacy of changes that have been implemented are called 
into question as sensemaking becomes increasingly prospective: what was previously a 
sensible present is transformed into a not so sensible future. By rendering the future as 
unfinalized and uncertain in this way, prospective sensemaking initiates a re-think of the past 
and a re-consideration of the present (cf. Dawson & Sykes, 2018), thereby re-configuring the 
relationship between the past, present, and future  
Our study thus contributes to the development of more complex appreciations of 
temporality in sensemaking research, which tends to divide up time and assume that the past 
is replaced by the present. In fact, the past “is always and already coexisting in the present” 
(Introna, 2019: 752), as “pasts and futures come together in temporal sensemaking of an 
emergent present” (Dawson & Sykes, 2019: 97). Our study of post-inquiry sensemaking 
reveals these dynamics. It occurs in the ‘present’ of the post-inquiry setting as individuals 
engage with the ‘past’ – the incident and inquiry. This ‘past’ is indelibly part of the ‘present’ 
in that cues embedded in the incident and inquiry are available for sensemaking in the post-
inquiry present. The ‘future’ is also part of the ‘present’ in that post-inquiry sensemaking 
involves the projection of cues into the future as a way of making sense of imagined, 
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hypothetical scenarios in which potential incidents may or may not materialize. But as 
sensemaking turns to the future, it also changes the past as shared understandings about 
‘successful’ implementation are revised. Prospective sensemaking thus draws from – and also 
alters – views of the present, as shifting interpretations may achieve only transitory stability 
(Wiebe, 2010). As such, the post-inquiry setting offers a unique opportunity to identify 
empirically some of the temporal complexity and fluidity to which theorists have alluded 
(e.g., Dawson & Sykes, 2019; Introna, 2019).  
The limitations of our study include the following. First, we relied on retrospective 
interviews and, as with any set of interviews, individuals have selected, omitted and forgotten 
certain details – interpreting and presenting their own reading of events. This created 
challenges, especially with our temporal analysis, since interviewees may have imposed a 
retrospective logic on events. We could therefore only infer a temporal sequence from our 
analysis of retrospective interviews, and our diagram is only indicative of the timing of each 
of the phases. Researchers could, therefore, build on our study by conducting longitudinal 
studies, where the precise timing of different sensemaking activities and sequencing of 
sensemaking phases can be investigated more rigorously. A second limitation is that we 
focused on practitioner sensemaking whereas other actors – inquiry members, politicians, 
media, the public, etc. – would also have been involved. Future research could, therefore, 
build on our work by using ethnographic methods to flesh out the different interactions 
involved in post-inquiry sensemaking. A third limitation is that our analysis is subjective and 
based on our interpretation of interviewees’ interpretations. We did not formally evaluate the 
effectiveness of the new practices. Future research could, therefore, examine the success (or 
failure) of post-inquiry sensemaking more systematically. Finally, we chose to conduct a 
more finely grained analysis on Recommendation One, rather than try to explore all 67 
recommendations. Tracking the implementation of other recommendations may have 
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generated different findings, although interviewees indicated that they had similar 
experiences with other recommendations.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, our study offers considerable insight into 
sensemaking in post-inquiry settings and provides a basis for future research to see if our 
model applies to other settings. It seems unlikely that it would apply to incidents because of 
the compression of time (e.g., Colville et al., 2013), as well as the absence or unavailability of 
forensic, authority, and organizational frames. However, inquiry sensemaking might 
incorporate features of our model: insofar as inquiries make recommendations, they may 
engage in prospective sensemaking; because they can call different experts and witnesses, 
they may have access to multiple frames; and they may involve sufficient time for sequential 
phases of sensemaking to occur. Another avenue for future research would be to explore 
whether our model applies to sensemaking during organizational/strategic change (e.g., 
Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Lüscher & Lewis, 2008). Despite not having the ‘legacy’ of an 
earlier incident or inquiry, organizational/strategic change often follows from some kind of 
consulting report containing recommendations, which could play a similar role to an inquiry 
report. Moreover, change initiatives may allow for access to multiple frames and involve 
sufficient time for sequential phases of sensemaking.  
Our model offers practical contributions for dealing with the aftermath of an inquiry. 
Retrospective sensemaking following the inquiry helps individuals to question previously 
taken-for-granted aspects of their professional practice that contributed to the incident. This 
helps organizations to address intractable problems where “it may be necessary first to 
unlearn existing responses” (Brook et al., 2015: 369). The second and third phases of 
sensemaking then enable organizations to develop new routines and resume activity after the 
incident and inquiry (cf. Christianson et al., 2009). This helps to address any secondary crisis 
within the organization caused by the incident and/or inquiry (cf. Smith & Elliott, 2007). 
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Finally, a more proactive and speculative form of sensemaking helps individuals to reflect 
anticipatorily on what may happen in the future despite – or because of – the changes that 
have been implemented.  
Post-inquiry sensemaking is important. Despite the tendency to dismiss inquiries as 
stage-managed events whose recommendations are political, they are nonetheless vehicles for 
developing recommendations for change that could reduce the chances of negative incidents 
reoccurring or, at least, reducing the adverse effects if they do. However, as our study shows, 
success depends upon more than simply making recommendations; it requires continued 
retrospective and prospective sensemaking in the post-inquiry setting to ensure that the 
recommendations are both implemented and reflected upon, enabling individuals to learn 
more deeply from the incident that give rise to the inquiry. As one practitioner told us: “I 
think what we’ve ended up with – and where we’re heading – is something greater than the 
sum of the 67 recommendations.”  
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Table 1: The Implementation of Recommendation One 
 Before Recommendation One After Implementing 
Recommendation One 
Changes in 
policy 
On days of high bushfire danger, the 
‘Stay or Go’ policy provided a 
framework for individuals to 
decide whether to stay and defend 
their property or leave early before 
the predicted passage of the fire 
Emergency management 
organizations offer explicit 
warnings on days of high fire 
danger about the severity of the 
fire and advise the actions that 
people should take  
Changes in 
responsibility  
Individuals living in fire prone areas 
were responsible for evaluating the 
specific risks they faced and 
making decisions based on their 
specific circumstances 
 
Emergency management 
organizations are responsible for 
providing individuals with tailored 
warnings that provide timely and 
informative advice about the 
predicted passage of fire and 
specify the actions to be taken by 
people potentially in its path  
Community members are responsible 
for acting on prescriptive advice 
Changes in 
practices 
Warnings were issued by emergency 
management organizations with 
little involvement from local 
communities 
Warnings were based on long range 
plans and forecasts with generic 
information relating to specific fire 
types  
 
Warnings are issued from incident 
control centres and posted 
electronically through a variety of 
websites and mobile applications 
Warnings explicitly advise 
individuals on the optimal 
timeframes for leaving their 
property 
Warnings require emergency 
management organizations to work 
with local government authorities, 
communities, ABC Radio and 
local radio stations 
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Table 2: Interviewees 
Senior Managers  Middle Managers  Functional Experts  
Assistant Chief Officer 1 Communications Manager 1  Brigade Captain 1  
Assistant Director 1 Community Education Manager 1  Community Engagement Officer 1  
Deputy Chief Officer 1  Community Engagement Manager 1  Community Information Officer 1 
Deputy Chief Officer 2 Community Engagement Manager 2  Fire Operations Officer 1 
Director 1  Community Safety Manager 1 Fire Planning Officer 1  
Director 2 Emergency Coordination Manager 1 Fire Planning Officer 2 
Director 3  Operations Manager 1  Firefighter 1 
Executive Director 1 Policy Manager 1 Firefighter 2 
Executive Director 2  Policy Manager 2  Incident Controller 1 
Regional Director 1 Project Manager 1  Incident Controller 2  
Regional Director 2  Project Manager 2  Incident Controller 3  
Senior Executive 1  Project Manager 3  Incident Controller 4  
Senior Fire Officer 1  Project Manager 4  Logistics Officer 1 
Senior Fire Officer 2  Regional Manager 1  Organizational Psychologist 1 
Senior Operations Officer 1  Regional Manager 2  Project Officer 1  
Senior Operations Officer 2  Regional Manager 3  Public Information Officer 1  
Senior Operations Officer 3 Regional Operations Manager 1 Public Information Officer 2 
State Coordinator 1  Regional Operations Manager 2  Public Information Officer 3  
State Operations Officer 1 Regional Operations Manager 3 Regional Fire Operations Officer 1  
Weather Services Manager 1  Regional Operations Manager 4 Regional Operations Officer 1  
 Senior Policy Officer 1  Regional Operations Officer 2  
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Table 3: Coding  
Descriptive 
Codes 
Descriptors Analytical codes  Sub-codes 
Post-Inquiry 
Equivocality: 
situations that 
allow for 
multiple 
meanings and 
interpretations 
 
References to 
‘uncertainty’, 
‘complications’, 
‘confusion’, ‘out 
of control’, 
doubt’, 
‘challenge’, 
‘conflict’ 
dilemma  
Degree of equivocality  High: interviewees report experiencing uncertainty, confusion, ambiguity 
Low: interviewees do not report experiencing uncertainty, confusion, 
ambiguity  
Change in equivocality 
 
Increasing: interviewees report ongoing experience of uncertainty, 
confusion, ambiguity 
Decreasing: interviewees give accounts of how greater certainty has been 
achieved 
Post-Inquiry 
Sensemaking: 
processes 
through which 
meanings are 
created and 
shared to make 
sense of 
equivocal inputs 
References to 
‘sense’, 
‘interpret’, 
‘understand’, 
‘discuss’, 
‘dialogue’, 
‘agree’ 
 
 Cues: anomalies and 
discrepancies located in 
talk, texts, interactions, 
events, experiences, that 
cause individuals to take 
note and engage in 
further interpretation  
Embedded in the incident: interviewees refer to anomalies they noted on 
Black Saturday  
Embedded in the inquiry: interviewees refer to anomalies noted in the 
hearings or the report of the Royal Commission  
Embedded in implementation: interviewees refer to anomalies in how 
current organizational practices align with recommendations 
Embedded in imagination: interviewees speculate about future anomalies 
Frames: interpretive 
schemes, based on 
experience, training, 
culture, identity, etc. that 
shape what people notice 
and what they decide 
requires further attention 
Professional: in reflecting on cues, interviewees refer to their professional 
expertise and/or practice 
Forensic: in reflecting on cues, interviewees refer to investigative 
processes and legal questioning 
Authority: in reflecting on cues, interviewees refer to legal/legislative 
requirements obliging them to act  
Organizational: in reflecting on cues, interviews refer to their experience 
and knowledge of the organization  
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Table 4: Illustrative Quotes for Post-Inquiry Equivocality 
Equivocality: situations that allow for multiple meanings and interpretations and are 
associated with confusion and ambivalence, uncertainty and/or ambiguity.  
High: uncertainty, 
confusion, 
ambiguity 
expressed  
Our government loves nothing more than to say we’ll just build fire 
refuges in every high-risk area, that will solve the problem. Well, it 
doesn’t. [First,] they won’t be able to afford it. Each of those things 
cost us a couple of million dollars each … The next public policy 
question is that we’re actually asking people to do something which 
is dangerous; which is to travel in the landscape at the last minute, 
when it’s burning. That’s the circumstances when most people will 
die during bushfire. So, are we encouraging people to take very risky 
last-minute actions that may result in [them] being killed? (Brigade 
Captain 1). 
Low: uncertainty, 
confusion, 
ambiguity not 
expressed  
There has been a move towards embracing [telecommunications] 
technology to manage our risk. Our facilities have had a big 
makeover. In our centre we’ve gone from 20 seats to 35. We had 
nearly $300,000 investment here because, really, we were being run 
as a call centre and not an information centre. So, that’s good (Public 
Information Officer 3). 
Increasing: 
accounts of 
ongoing 
uncertainty, 
confusion, 
ambiguity  
There’s still so much work to do – much to the frustration of many 
us. There are people operating in the same incident control centres 
and they are operating different technology systems. We certainly got 
a lot of money for a few years, but that lifecycle is ending now and 
the work that didn’t get done won’t get done … Sometimes we don’t 
even move forward (Assistant Chief Officer 1). 
Decreasing: 
accounts that 
greater certainty 
has been 
achieved  
In a general sense, I think that the clarity of control for large incidents 
is much better now than what it was pre-Black Saturday. No doubt. 
Generally, it has been, I think, a really positive thing. We’re much 
more consistent, working together better, more integrated … So, if 
you stand back and look at where we were pre-Black Saturday, pre-
Royal Commission to where we are now, we’re miles ahead. People 
get messages on their phones. They get rung at home. They get stuff 
on websites. The level of information is better. The speed is better. 
(Senior Fire Officer 2).  
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Table 5: Illustrative Quotes for Cues 
Cues: anomalies of some kind located in talk, texts, interactions, events, experiences, and 
material objects that cause individuals to take note of phenomena; their initial sense (or 
nonsense) is subjected to further interpretation to make more organized sense of them. 
Cues derived from 
practitioners’ 
experience of the fires 
(embedded in the 
incident) 
I remember saying to the Minister on Black Saturday when he 
came into the control centre wanting to know what was 
happening … He said: ‘How can you not know what’s 
happening?’ I said: ‘Have a look out there: you’ve got three 
phone systems, four computer systems in that room, [but] 
there are people who can’t talk to each other in the [same] 
building or even in that room! Do you know that?’ (Senior 
Fire Officer 1). 
Cues derived from 
practitioners’experience 
of participating in the 
hearings (embedded in 
the inquiry) 
On days like Black Saturday the emergency management 
arrangements get pretty complex There was vagueness about 
who was in charge and it's like it didn’t matter until it was put 
under extreme pressure Then under the extreme spotlight of 
the Royal Commission and suddenly it all rather looks shaky 
(Emergency Coordination Manager 1). 
Cues derived from 
practitioners’ 
experience of reading 
the final report 
(embedded in the 
inquiry) 
What happens when you get a Royal Commission [is] there’s 
a heap of recommendations, which we had to figure out We 
saw the same thing after ’39 (Black Friday Fires), we saw it 
after 1983 (Ash Wednesday fires) and we’ve seen it now after 
Black Saturday (State Coordinator 1). 
Cues derived from 
practitioners’ 
experience of their 
work (embedded in 
implementation) 
To some extent, the technology that they’re using is still the 
same. I think it’s very clunky and there’s probably better 
ways of doing it. What I have [also] noticed though is since 
the funding associated with that recommendation has ceased 
… we’ve pretty much shut down our warnings and 
information unit. So, there is nobody – there’s no team or one 
individual who is responsible from a project perspective on 
that. (Community Education Manager 1). 
Cues derived from 
anticipating future 
problems (embedded 
in imagination) 
A number of people would say we were actually lucky on 
Black Saturday. [However], it could have been a lot worse 
and one day it will be, and it will happen again. It’s not to say 
we're not stronger now than we were, but each [fire] event 
generates and identifies new weaknesses in our systems (State 
Operations Officer 1).   
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Table 6: Illustrative Quotes for Frames 
Frames: interpretive schemes, based on experience, training, socialization culture, identity 
that shape what people notice and what they decide requires further attention. 
Professional frame: 
drawing from expertise, 
training and identity as 
fire-fighters   
February 7th [Black Saturday] was [an example of] some of 
the best fire-fighting done anywhere in the world. A massive 
amount of work [was done by firefighters] to prevent more 
damage to amenities, to protect water catchments (Deputy 
Chief Officer 1). 
Forensic frame: drawing 
from the expertise, 
training and identity of 
lawyers, as well as the 
investigative process 
during the hearings 
The initial sitting in the Royal Commission was about my 
role on that day So, what information did we have, what 
warnings did we give out, what timeframe, etc. So, there was 
a bit of analysis of the role (Deputy Chief Officer 1). 
Authority frame: drawing 
from the official 
identity and legal status 
of the Royal 
Commission 
There’s no doubt that the recommendations have given very 
clear directions and policy for Government, and they’ve been 
agreed to by Government, so that’s that (Executive Director 
1). 
Organizational frame: 
drawing from the goals, 
structure, culture and 
identity of the 
organization 
The recommendations have resulted in degrees of changing 
the culture, changing the thinking, changing the approach for 
a whole range of things that weren’t ostensibly part of the 
recommendations per se. [Instead, this] has come out of – 
how can we do this better [organizationally] thinking? 
(Project Manager 4). 
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Table 7:  Comparison of the Four Phases of Post-Inquiry Sensemaking 
 Phase 1:  
Questioning 
Phase 2:  
New Tools and Technologies 
Phase 3:  
New Meanings of Work 
Phase 4:  
Speculating 
Cues Embedded in the incident: 
practitioners’ experience of 
managing fires on Black 
Saturday  
Embedded in the inquiry i.e., 
practitioners’ experience of 
participating in the 
Commission’s hearings 
and/or reading its report 
Embedded in the inquiry: 
practitioners’ experience of 
participating in the 
Commission’s hearings 
and/or reading its report 
Embedded in implementation:  
practitioners’ experience of 
their work  
Embedded in the inquiry: 
practitioners’ experience of 
participating in the 
Commission’s hearings 
and/or reading its report 
Embedded in implementation: 
practitioners’ experience of 
their work 
Embedded in the imagination 
i.e., practitioners’ 
anticipation of future fires 
 
Temporality of 
sensemaking 
Retrospective: cues are 
recalled from the incident 
and the inquiry  
 
Retrospective and 
prospective: cues are 
recalled from the inquiry 
and projected into future 
implementation 
Retrospective and 
prospective: cues are 
recalled from the inquiry 
and projected into future 
implementation 
Prospective: cues are 
projected into an imagined 
future  
Frame Professional frame: cues are 
recognized because the 
fire’s behaviour did not 
conform to professional 
expectations 
Forensic frame: cues are 
recognized as a result of 
being subjected to legal 
questioning  
Authority frame: cues are 
recognized because of legal 
obligations to act on 
recommendations 
Professional frame: cues are 
recognized because of signs 
that new tools and 
technologies will not 
conform to professional 
expectations 
Authority frame: cues are 
recognized because of legal 
obligations to act on 
recommendations 
Organizational frame: cues 
are recognized because of 
signs that recommendations 
do not align with current 
organizational arrangements 
Professional frame: cues are 
recognized because new 
practices may not meet 
professional expectations in 
future fires 
New understandings 
as a result of 
sensemaking  
 New understanding that 
existing practices failed 
during Black Saturday 
New understanding of how 
the community can be 
warned more effectively  
New understanding that fire 
‘fighting’ involves warning 
the community 
New understanding that newly 
implemented practices may 
fail in future bushfires 
Effect on equivocality Equivocality increases Equivocality decreases Equivocality decreases Equivocality increases 
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Figure 1:  Coding Structure 
 
Phase I Sensemaking
• Equivocality increases
• Sensemaking is retrospective: cues are embedded in 
incident, inquiry
• Professional, forensic frames
Descriptive 
Codes
Analytic  Codes Sub-Codes Pattern Codes
Sensemaking
Equivocality
Cues
Degree of 
equivocality
Change in 
equivocality
High 
Increasing
Frames
Organizational
Embedded in 
incident
Phase II Sensemaking
• Equivocality decreases
• Sensemaking is retrospective, some prospective: cues are 
embedded in inquiry, implementation
• Authoritative, professional frames
Phase III Sensemaking
• Equivocality decreases 
• Sensemaking mainly prospective, some retrospective: cues 
are  embedded in implementation, inquiry
• Authoritative, organizational frames
Phase IV Sensemaking
• Equivocality increases
• Sensemaking is prospective: cues are embedded in 
imagination
• Professional frame
Low
Decreasing
Embedded in 
implementation
Embedded in 
inquiry
Authoritative
Forensic
Professional
Embedded in 
imagination
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Figure 2: A Model of Post Inquiry Sensemaking 
 
Indicates degree of equivocality
Time of Inquiry 
Eq
ui
vo
ca
lit
y
Low
Phase I: Retrospective sensemaking 
allows practitioners to question 
existing understandings of 
professional assumptions that may 
have contributed to the incident 
Phase II: Retrospective and 
prospective sensemaking allows 
practitioners to develop new tools and 
technologies that address 
shortcomings in professional practice
Phase IV: Prospective sensemaking 
allows practitioners to speculate 
on whether the new tools, 
technologies and meanings will 
address future incidents
Phase III: Retrospective and 
prospective sensemaking 
changes meanings of work to 
incorporate new tools and 
technologies
Post-Inquiry Sensemaking Over Time 
High
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